Educational market analysis only. Not financial advice.

On 14 October, two ships sank near the Strait of Hormuz. Both had been hit by projectiles. One of them, the dry bulk carrier Cape Dao, had been struck on 23 September and stayed afloat for three weeks. The other was a container ship, the GFS Pride. [2]

Neither was a tanker. Keep that in mind.

Oil is still moving through Hormuz. More of it, in fact, than a few months ago. But a waterway can be busy and dangerous at the same time. Today HormuzEye raises its Risk Monitor from 88 to 92. That keeps it in the Severe category and reverses the cut we made on 4 October.

First, what the number is not. 92 does not mean a 92% chance that the strait closes. It is not a forecast that shipments will stop. It is our judgment of how exposed the system is to disruption. And that exposure has grown.

Ships are being hit, and not every attack is reported

The clearest evidence comes from UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), the Royal Navy centre that tracks security incidents involving merchant ships in the region.

In its weekly overview of 16 October, UKMTO counted 12 attacks in the Gulf region. Ten were in the Strait of Hormuz. One was in the Arabian Gulf, one in the Gulf of Oman. [1]

Then comes a sentence that worries me more than the number. UKMTO warned that many attacked ships are not reporting incidents directly. So 12 is a floor, not a total. How far below the real figure it sits, nobody knows. We won't guess.

Put yourself in a shipowner's chair. You don't only ask whether your ship can get through. You ask whether your crew will come home, and whether the freight rate pays for that risk. Not knowing weighs on that decision as heavily as the damage you can count.

Every completed voyage proves that passage is possible. It does not prove that the danger has passed.

This is not only an oil story

Back to those two sunken ships. One timeline point first: they were two reported losses on 14 October, not two new attacks that day. Cape Dao had been hit three weeks earlier.

But look at what they carried. A container ship full of goods. A bulk carrier full of raw materials. Hormuz is a trade route for far more than crude.

If you only watch tanker numbers, you miss the crews, the container services and the bulk trades that use the same water. We assess the strait as a shipping system, not as a pipeline that happens to float.

The bypass is a back door, not a safe room

Saudi Arabia's answer to Hormuz is Yanbu, its oil hub on the Red Sea. Crude can reach it overland and ship out without passing through the strait.

Late on 16 October, Reuters reported that the Saudi-led coalition said it had intercepted a ballistic missile heading for Yanbu. [3]

Let's be precise. This is a statement by the coalition. Nothing in it shows damage to the terminal or a halt to exports. An intercepted missile and a damaged terminal are different events. We will not treat them as the same.

Still, the attempt tells us something. A bypass reduces dependence on one chokepoint. It does not make the oil safe. Pipelines, terminals and the ships leaving them can be targeted too.

Oil painting of pipelines and loading arms at a Gulf oil terminal, with a moored tanker beneath a crimson sky.

More oil, thinner cushions

There is good news, and it deserves a fair hearing.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) published its monthly Oil Market Report on 14 October. It estimates that oil flows through Hormuz recovered to 10.9 million barrels a day in September. Exports via bypass routes reached 5.6 million barrels a day. [4] Those are September averages. They tell us nothing about today.

The same report holds a less comfortable number. By the end of September, observed global oil stocks stood 509 million barrels below their end of February level. Stocks on land were at their lowest since at least 2016. [4]

Think of stocks as a shock absorber. When a delivery is late, a refinery or a buyer draws on what sits in storage. That buffer is now thin. A setback the market could have absorbed in February would hurt more today.

So the question is not whether oil flowed in September. It did. The question is whether it can keep flowing through the next disruption, with less to fall back on.

Cheaper freight is not the same as safer seas

On 16 October, Reuters reported that supertanker rates had come down from record highs. [5] Good news? Not necessarily.

Reuters linked the drop partly to weaker demand after the attacks and lower export volumes. Partly also to the chance that sanctions relief would put more tankers on the market. Rates can fall simply because fewer cargoes need moving. That is a symptom, not a recovery.

We would believe in a recovery when cheaper freight comes together with steady shipments and fewer verified attacks. One without the others proves little.

Oil painting of a street fuel pump overlooking a coastal refinery and tanker beneath a crimson sky.

What the number can and cannot tell you

Let's be honest about the limits. The direction of this change is better supported than the exact figure. Could it be 91 or 93? Yes. Is the risk higher than on 4 October? We think it clearly is.

The score is not a formula that turns attack counts into points. Don't use it as a trading signal. And it is no substitute for security advice on a specific voyage.

Three rules we apply when reading our own monitor:

  • Ship counts and barrels measure different things. A number of passages tells you nothing about how much oil moved.
  • Reporting periods stay separate. A weekly attack total cannot be set against a monthly flow average.
  • Missing data means uncertainty. It is not a licence to invent a number.

The case for 92 is renewed danger to ships combined with thin buffers. The case against going higher is that a great deal of oil is still demonstrably moving.

What would bring the score down

We would need to see improvement on several fronts at once, and for a while:

  • Fewer verified attacks, week after week, with reporting complete enough to trust the decline.
  • Steady or rising shipments, with ship movements and cargo volumes checked separately.
  • Evidence that Yanbu and other bypass routes keep running, and that the threats against them ease.
  • Stocks that stop falling, so the market has a cushion again.

A quiet day helps. So does a diplomatic statement. Neither, on its own, proves anything lasting.

And what would push the score up? More confirmed ship losses. Damage that takes export capacity offline. A sustained fall in verified shipments.

Oil painting of Arabic coffee, tea and dates on a terrace overlooking a Gulf oil terminal at sunset.

For importers, logistics firms and energy buyers, it all comes down to one question. Does the cargo arrive on time, at a price you can live with? That link between security at sea and oil on land is what we will keep watching.

Oil is moving. But it would take less to knock it off course now than it did in September.

Assessment: 92 / Severe. Raised from 88 on 17 October 2026.

Read the HormuzEye Risk Monitor.

Sources

  1. UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), 16 October 2026: Weekly Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) overview, Gulf incident section, PDF page 3.
  2. Reuters, 14 October 2026: Two ships sink near Hormuz after being hit by projectiles amid surge in attacks.
  3. Reuters, published 16 October 2026, 21:51 UTC; report datelined 17 October: Missiles hit Aden airport as Saudi-led coalition intercepts missile headed for Yanbu.
  4. International Energy Agency (IEA), 14 October 2026: Oil Market Report, October 2026. September observations are labelled separately from the October assessment.
  5. Reuters, 16 October 2026: Supertanker rates fall from record highs.

Disclaimer: HormuzEye provides educational and informational market analysis only. This content is not financial advice, not investment advice, and not a buy or sell recommendation. Oil markets are volatile and geopolitical events can change quickly. Always do your own research and consult a qualified financial adviser before making investment decisions.